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[L. A. No. 20275. In Bank. Nov. 21,1947.] 
JOHN E. LOUST ALOT, as Sheriit, etc., Petitioner, v. THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY et at, 
Respondents. 
[1] Wortmen's Oompensation-Oertiorari.-In the exercise of its 
normal jurisdiction with respect to compensation awards or 
safety rules. the decisions of the Industrial Accident Com-
mission are subject to review only by the method set forth 
in the workmen's compensation law, which is by an applica-
tion for a writ of review in an appellate court. (Lab. Code, 
§§ 5810. 5950. 5955. 6600. 6601.) 
[I] Id.-Oertiorarl-Scope of Beview.-In Lab. Code, § 5955, de-
~ claring that no court other than the Supreme Court and the 
,. District Conrts of Appeal "to the extent herein specified" has 
jurisdiction to review any decision of the Industrial Accident 
Commission, the Quoted words refer, not to the method. but 
to the extent of the review, namely, the extent to which a 
court having jurisdiction ean review the decision as speeifled 
in ~§ 5952. nlln3. 
[1] See 27 Oal.Jur. 570. 
KcK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Workmen's Compensation, § 261; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 267; [3, 4] Workmen's Compen-
aation, § 277.1; [6] Habeas Corpus, § 73. 
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[3] ld.-Habeas Corpus.-Exoept in so far as review of commis-
sion action by habeas corpus might involve the validity of a 
oompensation award or safety rule, the writ of habeas corpus 
is available to attack the validity of an order of the Industrial 
Accident Commission imprisoning one for contempt. 
[4] Id.-Habeas Corpus.-In view of the faot that superior courts 
under Lab. Code, § 5955, have no jurisdiction to review or 
annul a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission, such 
a oourt does not have jurisdiotion to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus on the ground of invalidity of an order of the commis-
sion imprisoning one for contempt. 
[6] ld. - Judicial Beview.-An order of the Industrial Accident 
Commission, even though erroneous, may not be reviewed or 
annulled by the superior court and must stand as a proper 
and legal order unless reversed by the Supreme Court or by 
a District Court of Appeal. 
[6] Habeas Corpus-AppeaL-No appeal lies from a decision of 
a superior court on habeas corpus unless under Pen. Code, 
§ 1506, it constitutes an order discharging a person convicted 
of an offense prosecuted by indictment or information. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Kern County, and W. L. Bradshaw, Judge thereof, 
from taking further steps in a habeas corpus proceeding. Writ 
granted. 
Tom Scott, District Attorney, R. C. McKellips and Elvin 
B. Connolly for Petitioner. 
V. P. DiGiorgio for Respondentl. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, the sherifr of Kern County, 
California, seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain further pro-
ceedings in the Superior Court in and for the County of 
Kern in the matter of the application of Earl 14. Price, here-
inafter referred to as defendant, for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Defendant mailed a letter to the Industrial Accident Com-
mission of California censuring a deeision of that commission 
in a proceeding in which he was concerned. The commission 
adjudged defendant to be in contempt, and ordered that he 
be delivered to the custody of petitioner and that petitioner 
collect a fine of $50 from him or, in default thereof, that de-
fendant be committed to the Kern County jail for a term 
of five days. Defendant refused to pay the fine and was com-
mitted to the county jail. He then filed an a.pplication for 
l 
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a writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court 
questioning the power of the Industrial Accident Commission 
to commit him to jail for mailing the letter. Honorable W. L. 
Bradshaw, the judge presiding in department two of that 
court, granted the writ but subsequently transferred the cause 
to the. District Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
on the ground that the superior court was without jurisdic-
tion. The District Court of Appeal (in re Price, 4 Crim., 
585, July 8, 1947) ordered the matter retransferred to the 
Superior Court of Kern County, where the matter is now 
pending. 
The alternative writ of prohibition was granted to deter-
mine whether the superior court had jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus in this matter. (Browne v. Superi.or 
Court, 16 Cal.2d 593, 597 [107 P.2d 1, 131 A.L.R. 276].) 
The Constitution of this state confers on the superior courts 
jurisdiction to issue writs of "habeas corpus by or on behalf 
of any person in actual custody. in their respective counties." 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5.) Within their respective counties, 
the jurisdiction of the superior courts under this provision 
is generally considered concurrent with that of appellate 
courts. (I'll. re Zany, 164 Cal. 724, 726 [130 P. 710]; I'll. re 
Hugku, 159 Cal. 360, 364 [113 P. 684]; cf., however, France 
v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. 122, 127 [255 P. 815, 52 A.L.R. 
869].) Section 21 of article :xx of the California Constitu-
tion provides, however, that the Legislature is "vested with 
plenary powers, unlimited by any provision of this Consti-
tution, to create, and enforce a complete syBtem of workmen's 
compensation, by appropriate leo<rislation. ••• " In creating 
this system, the Legislature is likewise granted "plenary 
powers" to fix and control "the manner of review of decisions 
rendered by the tribunal or tribunals designated by it; pro-
I vided, that all decisions of any such tribunal shall be sub-
• ject to review by the appellate courts of this State." There 
are, therefore, two questions for decision with respect to the 
jurisdiction of the superior court in this ease: whether the 
j Legislature has constitutionally fixed the manner of rtviewing 
Industrial Accident Commission decisions so as to exclude 
habeas corpus as an appropriate remedy, and whether the 
Legislature has so fixed the manner of reviewing decisions 
of the commission as to exclude superior courts from juris-
, diction to review or otherwise interfere with the order in 
~ question. 
• 
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[1] In the exercise of its nonnal jurisdiction with respect 
to compensation awards or safety rules, the decisions of the 
commission are subject to review only by the methods set 
forth in the workmen's compensation law. (Lab. Code, §§ 5810, 
6600-6601, 5950, 5955.) In these sections the Legislature 
has properly exercised its power to control the jurisdiction 
of the courts in regard to workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings. (Thaxter v. Finn, 178 Cal. 270, 273 [173 P. 163] i 
North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Soley, 193 Cal. 138, 140 [223 P. I 
462J.) The question whether habeas corpus is available to 
interfere with or review a contempt order of the commis-
sion is therefore solely one of statutory construction. 
Section 5810 of the Labor Code provides that orders, de-
cisions, or awards of the commission, made under division 
four of the Labor Code, the provisions with respect to com-
pensation proceedings, "may be reviewed by the courts speci-
fied in sections 5950 to 5956 within the time and in the manner 
therein specified and not otherwise." The manner therein 
specified is an application for a writ of review in an appellate 
court after :filing a petition for rehearing with the commission 
(Lab. Code, § 5950) or an application for a writ of mandate 
in a proper ease. (Lab. Code, § 5955.) The courts specified 
in those sections are the Supreme Court and the District 
Courts of Appeal. (Ibid.) The scope of review afforded the 
petitioner is specified in sections 5952 and 5953. The same 
provisions are made the exclusive methods of review for pro-
ceedings under part one of division five of the Labor Code, 
with respect to workmen's safety. Whatever contempt powers 
the commission may have (a question not before this court 
in the present proceeding) are provided in sections 133 and 
134 of division one of the Labor Code. Sections 5810, 6600 and 
6601 are not applicable to proceedings thereunder. Reference 
to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 I 
(Stats. 1917, p. 831) makes this conclusion abundantly clcar. 
Sections 133 and 134 are continuations of section 63 of that 
act. (Lab. Code, § 2.) Section 22 of the Workmen's Com-
I pensation Act of 1917 upon which section 5810 is based, ap-
/ plied only to proceedings under sections 6 to 31 of that act. 
Section 6600 and 6601, governing safety proceedings, are 
based on section 45 of the 1917 act and that section applied 
only to decisions under the safety provisions of the act. 
[2] It has been suggested in one District Court of Appeal 
decision, however, that section 5955 prohibits court review of!: 
I 
) 
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any decision or order of the commission except by writ of 
review after a petition for rehearing. (See Western Pipe 
ct 8. Co. v. IndustriaZ Acc. Com., 119 Cal.App. 19, 20 [5 P.2d 
920].) This section provides that, "No court of this State, 
except the supreme court and the district courts of appeal 
to the e.."ttent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, re-
verse, correct, or annul any order, rule, decision, or award 
of the commission • . • but a writ of mandate shan lie from 
the supreme court or the district courts of appeal in all proper 
eases." The suggested construction of section 5955 was un-
necessary to the decision in that ease, for it was concemed 
with the availability of the writ of prohibition in a compen-
sation proceeding, a matter clearly controlled by section 5810. 
The words "to the extent herein specified" in section 5955 
refer, not to the method, but to the extent of the review, 
namely, the extent to which a court having jurisdiction can 
review the decision as specified in sections 5952 and 5953 
of the Labor Code. Any other construction would make sec-
tions 5810, 6600 and 6601 superftuous. 
It thus appears that the Legislature has not provided an 
exclusive method of reviewing decisions of the commission 
except in so far as compensation awards or safety rules are 
involved. The decision in Brophy v. IndustriaZ Ace. Com., 46 
;. Cal.App.2d 278 [115 P.2d 835], is in accord with this conclu-
sion. In this case the court reviewed and annulled a contempt 
, order of the commission without requiring that a petition for 
rehearing be first filed with the commission. (See Brophy v. 
" IttdwtriaZ Ace. Com., 6 Cal. Compo Cases 15, 16.) Implicit 
, in that decision is the holding that the normal proceedings 
. specified 'for the review of the commission's decisions or 
orders (Lab. Code, § 5950) are inapplicable to the review of 
, orders of the commission when the validity of compensation 
, awards or safety rules are not involved. Moreover, the de-
,.,: eision of this court in In re Victor, 220 Cal. 729, 730 [32 P.2d 
" 608], is authority for the proposition that habeas corpus is 
, available to determine the jurisdiction of the commission to 
, punish for contempt. As will hereafter appear, section 67 
of the Public Utilities Act (Stat&. ex. aess. 1911, p. 55; 
: Stats. 1915, p. 161; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 6386) 
< contains substantially the same provision with regard to the 
Publie Utilities Commission, as is contained in section 5955 
of the Labor Code, except that jurisdiction is limited to the 
:' Supreme Court. In the Victor case, this court granted a 
.. 
) 
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writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of a con-
tempt order of the Railroad Commission. 
[3] Except in so far as review of commission action by 
habeas corpus might involve the validity of a compensation 
award or safety rule, that writ is available to attack the 
validity of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission 
imprisoning defendant for contempt. [4] It does not fol-
low, however, that because habeas corpus is available to de-
fendant, the superior court had jurisdiction to issue the writ 
in this case. Although section 5955 does not provide an ex-
clusive method for reviewing such orders or decisions, it 
clearly defines the courts having jurisdiction to reverse, annul 
or otherwise interfere with the operation of any order or 
decision of the commission: "No court of this State, except 
the supreme court and the district courts of appeal to the 
extent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse, 
correct, or annul any order, rule, decision, or award of the 
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution 
thereof, or to restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the commis-
sion in the performance of its duties . .•. " (Italics added.) 
This court has recognized the power of the Legislature under 
section 21 of article XX of the Constitution to limit the juris-
diction of the courts in reviewing Industrial Accident Com-
mission decisions. (Thaxter v. Finn, supra, 178 Cal. 270, 273; 
North Pacific 8. S. Co. v. Soley, supra, 193 Cal. 138, 140; 
see Hanna, Industrial Accident Commission Practice and 
Procedure, 275.) 
An examination of the legislative history of section 5955 
and of the decisions construing the similar section of the 
Public Utilities Act clearly shows that section 5955 means that 
superior courts have no jurisdiction to review or otherwise 
interfere with the operation of any order of the Industrial 
Accident Commission. The first workmen's compensation act 
in this state, the Roseberry Act, provided for review of de-
cisions of the Industrial Accident Board by the superior 
courts, subject to appeal to this court. (Stats. 1911, p. 804, 
§ 18; see Great Western Power Co. v. p,msbury, 170 Cal. 180, 
182 [149 P. 35].) At the time this act was passed the superior 
courts had similar jurisdiction to annul decisions and orders 
of the Railroad Commission. (Stats. 1909, p. 506, § 22.) In 
the same year that the Roseberry Act was passed, an amend-
ment to the Constitution was adopted granting the Legislature 
full authority to confer any powers on the Railroad Com.mis-
) 
/ 
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sion. (Art. XII, § 22, as amended October 10, 1911.) The 
Legislature then pa..c:;sed the Public Utilities Act of 1911 which 
provided in section 67 that, "No court of this state (except 
the supreme court to the e.'ttent herein specified) shall have 
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order 
or decision of the commission or to suspend or delay the execu-
tion or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere 
with the commission in the performance of its oftlcial duties; 
provided that the writ of mandamus shall lie from the su-
preme court to the commission in all proper cases." (Stats. 
Ex. Sess. 1911, p. 55; reenacted in Stats. 1915, p. 161.) 
In 1913, the Legislature passed the second workmen's com-
pensation act, known as the Boynton Act, creating the In-
dustrial Accident Commission. Section 84 of that Act (Stats. 
1913, p. 318) contains a provision that follows almost word for 
word section 67 of the Public Utilities Act, except that juris-
diction to review, reverse, or annul commission orders or 
decisions is conferred on both the Supreme Court and the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal. In the same year this court held that 
section 67 of the Public Utilities Act was a proper exercise of 
the power conferred on the Legislature by the Constitution 
to deprive superior courts of jurisdiction to review or inter-
fere with decision of the Railroad Commission. (Pacific Tele-
phone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 652, 658 [137 P. 
1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.AN.S. 652].) Following 
the decision in that case, the Legislature reenacted section 84 
of the Boynton Act as section 67 of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of 1917. (Stats. 1917, p. 875.) Article XX, sec-
tion 21 of the Constitution was then amended to its present 
form, conferring plenary power of the Legislature to control 
the review of Industrial Accident Commission decisions sub-
ject to the condition that decisions may be reviewed by the 
appeUate courts. The amendment also ratified the creation 
of the commission and all the functions vested therein. In 
1937, the provision in question was incorporated into the 
Labor Code without change as section 5955. 
The foregoing legislative history shows without question 
that section 67 of the Public Utilities Act provided the model 
for section 5955 and that the decisions interpreting section 67 
are likewise applicable thereto. The construction of section 
67 of the Public Utilities Act adopted in the Pacift,c Telephone , 
. case, supra, has been followed in subsequent cases. (Sexton v. 
; Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 173 Cal. 760, 762 [161 P. 748]; WGllace 
) 
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Ranch W. Co. v. Foothill D. Co., 5 Ca1.2d 103, 121 [53 P.2d 
929}; People v. Hadley, 66 Cal.App. 370, 374 [226 P. 836]; 
Independent Laundry v. Railroad Com., 70 Cal.App.2d 816, 
.822 [161 P.2d 827]; see Truck Owner. &; Shipper. Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 194 Cal. 146, 152 [228 P. 19].) It is thus 
settled that a superior court has "no jurisdiction directly or 
indirectly to overrule an order of the railroad commission. 
The power to reverse, review, correct or annul orders of that 
commission rests solely in the Supreme Court (sec. 67 of the 
Public Utilities Act, suprG) and the superior court is without 
jurisdiction in the premises." (Wallace Ranch W. Co. v. Foot-
hill D. Co., supra, at 121.) "Even though the order by the rail-
road commission be palpably erroneous in point of law, until 
some order by the Supreme Court may be issued to the con-
trary, the original order of the commission must stand as a 
proper and legal order in the premises. • • • Such being the 
state of the law, it would follow that, as is provided by the act 
itself, the only relief which the aggrieved party may have 
from such an order is by or through a writ issued by the Su-
preme Court." (People v. Hadley, suprG, at 375.) 
[6] Likewise, an order of the Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, even though erroneous, may not be reviewed or annulled 
by the superior court and must stand as a proper and legal 
order until reversed by this court or a District Court of Ap-
peal. The only relief aJforded the aggrieved party is a writ 
by this court or a District Court of Appeal. The Constitution 
grants to the Legislature "plenary power, unlimited by any 
pro'lJision 0/ this constitution, to create and enforce a complete 
system of workmen's compensation, by appropriate legisla-
tion. • • ." Moreover, it is expressly declared to be "the social 
public policy of this State, binding upon all departments of 
the State government," that the Legislature have full power 
to create a tribunal vested "with all the requisite govern-
mental functions to determine any dispute or matter arising 
under such legislation, to the end that the administration of 
such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all 
cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and wilhout encumbrGnce 
0/ any cMracter • .•• " (Article xx, § 21; italics added.) 
The only limitation on this legislative power with respect to 
the tribunal in question, is the provision for review of ita 
decisions by this court and the District Courts of Appeal. 
In restricting any interference with the commission's de-
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Legislature has carried out the declared policy of the consti-
tutional provision that the commission be unencumbered by 
any but proceedings in the appellate courts. By granting a 
petition for habeas corpus. the superior court clearly inter-
feres with the operation of the commission's order. More-
over, if the superior eourt dise.bArged defendant, that decision 
would have the effeet of annulling the commission's order. 
Even if the commission's order is valid, the decision of the 
superior court would be final. and not subject to review by 
the appellate court.&. [6) No appeal lies from a decision 
of a superior court on habea.s corpus (In re Zany, 164 Cal. 
724, 726 [130 P. 710]), unless under the provision of sec-
tion 1506 of the Penal Code it constitutes an order discharging 
a person convicted oi an offense prosecuted by indictment or 
information. (In re Page, 214 Cal. 350, 354 [5 P.2d 605]; 
In re A.lpine, 203 Cal. 731, 744, 745 [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 
1500]; In re JIurdock, 5 CaL2d 644, 646 [55 P.2d 843).) The 
Legislature, in aeeord with the Constitution, has provided 
that the legality of any order of the commission can be ques-
tioned only by the a.ppeD.ate eourts. Certainly, the superior 
courts were not meant to have jurisdiction to determine finally 
the legality of such an order. Any such interference with an 
order of the commjssion m:JSt be considered an "encum-
brance" on the administratkm of the workmen's compensa-
tion laws, within the power of the Legislature to prohibit. The 
defendant, if unlawfully imprisoned, is not denied an ade-
quate remedy, btrt must seek relief in an appellate court hav-
ing jurisdiction to renew or annul the order in question. 
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., St..enk, J .. 'ES.monds, J., Carter, J., Schauer 
J., and Spen~ J.. ecm.ew~ 
